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Abstract 
This study examines the influence, independence and effectiveness level of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia (FDRE) legislature throughout the policy making process in the first year of the fifth tenure in 2016. To 
this end, descriptive research design is used and heavily relied on data gathered from a number of relevant 
documents and other related secondary sources. The findings indicate that even if most of the legislative and 
oversight powers are vested in it, the FDRE legislature is practically powerless and ineffective in using these 
important mandated powers. Moreover, the results clarify that rubber stamp parliamentary model is the typology 
that best describes the legislature. The findings further suggest that the legislature’s ineffectiveness might be 
attributed to the presence of a single dominant party which continually practices strict party discipline on its 
members, along with the absence of opposition parties in the House. Hence, we recommend that there is a timely 
need to winding the political space for the opposition parties and the legislature, as well as to make major levels 
of structural and administrative system improvements to make the FDRE legislature more effective in performing 
its public policy making role.  
Keywords: FDRE legislature; parliamentary model; power and effectiveness 
 
Introduction 
Legislatures are known to be key actors in the political system of a nation and have a lot of roles to play in 
enhancing good governance and democracy. Some of their basic functions are representing the needs and wishes 
of citizens and groups; reflecting and bringing their needs, aspirations, problems, concerns, and priorities to the 
policymaking process; identifying problems and making policies to address them; and overseeing the 
implementation of policies so as to assure policies and programs are carried out legally, effectively, and according 
to the legislative intent (Remini, 2007; Franchino & Holland, 2008; Jonson, 2005).  
Furthermore, scholars tend to agree that the extent and nature of the role played by legislatures in the 
policymaking process vary greatly from country to country (Johnson, 2005). On the one hand, there are countries 
whose legislatures are more influential, proactive and constructive in developing their own legislative proposals 
independently and thus participate along with the executive in directing the policy agenda. Furthermore, there are 
nations which have the simplest of legislatures usually known as “rubber stamp” legislatures. Such legislatures` 
role in the policy making process is fairly marginal: they simply endorse legislative proposals made by parties and/ 
or the executive branch; they do have little capacity or willingness to scrutinize the conduct of government (Jonson, 
2005; Saiegh, 2005). 
In addition, there is a broad part in the central point where legislatures can show signs of different degrees of 
doings in the policy making process and turn into good places of real dialogue, speech, and debate. Arena 
legislatures receive policy initiates made elsewhere by parties and/ or the executive branch but differences in 
society are articulated and the proposed policy are evaluated from diverse perspectives. If the required capacities 
are built, such legislatures can organize debate, efficiently analyze proposals and comment on them critically, and 
to some degree block some of what the executive branch proposes or refine executive initiatives. However, there 
is a dire need for common indexes to measure the practical power and level of effectiveness of legislatures. 
Although very few studies present indexes of parliamentary power of national legislatures, these pay higher 
attention to the overall duties of legislatures rather that merely focusing on the legislative function. Moreover, they 
pay little attention to the effectiveness level of legislatures in performing their legislative function. For instance, 
M. Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig (2007) constructed a Parliamentary Powers Index with 32 items that mainly 
consider the powers of a national legislature. This index assesses the strength of the national legislature of every 
country in the world with a population of at least a half-million inhabitants in relation to the legislature's way over 
the executive, its institutional autonomy, its authority in specific areas, and institutional capacity. Regardless of 
this, the index gives no particular attention to the legislative function and effectiveness level of national legislatures 
in the policy making process. Similarly, some studies on legislative function of the FDRE legislature contribute a 
lot to the policy making process and the roles played by the legislature (Abebe, 2005; Tiruye, 2015; Kahsay, 2013; 
Atsbeha, 2012; and Awel, 2011) but lacks systematic analysis about its practical power and effectiveness level in 
the policy making process on the basis of a common objective and measurable framework. Likewise, in depth 
analysis of the powers and effectiveness level as well as the parliamentary model that best explains the legislature, 
remains understudied. 
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The lack of all-round instrument to assess the practical power and effectiveness level of FDRE legislature 
calls for the usefulness of constructing an index that can adequately address the case under study. This paper 
therefore, proposes and applies a legislative power and effectiveness index (LPEI), that is a broader measure of 
the effectiveness level of the FDRE legislature in terms of its practical power and influence in the policy making 
process. It’s believed that the LPEI can be applied, potentially, to any national legislature. Furthermore, exploring 
more about the parliamentary model that best describes the FDRE parliament is believed to be important not only 
to offer an explanation for its unsatisfactorily low level of performance in the national public policy making process 
but also to imply ways for changes to make the legislature more powerful, independent and effective in the future. 
 
Models of Parliamentary Power 
The concept of parliamentary power, which encompasses numerous meanings, has a lot to do in explaining the 
independence and effectiveness of legislatures. Despite of various meanings of power, Beetham (2006) describes 
two of its meanings as particularly relevant in terms of legislature’s effectiveness: 
The first is power as a capacity: having the relevant legal rights and resources – financial, human and 
organizational – to carry out necessary tasks. The second is power as relational: here having sufficient 
power and independence in relation to the executive to oversee it effectively (p.115). 
In order to better know the power and independence of legislatures some scholars have developed some 
typologies so as to categorize a model of parliamentary power. Among these typologies, it is Johnsons’ typology 
which is referred constantly. Regardless of the variations across countries, Johnson (2005) argues that legislative 
branches can be categorized in any of the three major models of parliamentary power rooted in the power and 
influences they have and exercise over the executive branch of governments. The three types or models of 
parliamentary power are: Rubber stamp legislatures, Arena legislatures, and Transformative legislatures. The 
distinctive features of each model of parliamentary power are presented in this section as follow: 
 
Rubber Stamp Legislatures 
It is the simplest model of legislatures which is characterized by its little independence and insignificant power 
over the executive. In this model any legislation draft made and submitted by the executive or other actors out of 
the parliament is simply accepted and endorsed without any meaningful debate and change. Some considered such 
legislatures as largely symbolic bodies that endorse choices made elsewhere in the society in general and the 
decisions made by political leader in particular (Johnson and Nakamura, 1999). The majority of parliamentarians 
in rubber stamp legislatures are not free to make decisions according to their consciousness, or the wish of their 
constituencies rather they tend to stick with the choice and intent of the ruling political party in which they are 
included as a member. Most believe that this type of legislatures are neither expensive to operate nor demand 
adequate internal structure or expert staff since they are not required to participate actively and meaningfully.  
Moreover, rubber stamp legislatures are generally considered as non-democratic and the least effective 
models of legislatures. However, it should be noted that such legislatures are not always restricted to non-
democratic political systems. In support of this Johnson and Nakamura (1999) argue as follows: 
While the term "rubber stamp" is often used in an unflattering fashion and equated with undemocratic, 
being a "rubber stamp" is not necessarily undemocratic, nor bad. Leaving aside non-democratic societies, 
a rubber stamp legislature may be justified in democratic terms if the decision made by the external body 
should be made by them for democratic reasons. … Sometimes proponents of strong party systems, in which 
the political parties are expected to go to the people with a detailed program, advocate a minimum of 
legislative involvement and prescribe strict discipline over the dominant party’s legislative members. The 
reasoning is that when the people vote for a party’s candidates, they simultaneously vote for the party’s 
program, and obligate the winners to follow through on what amounts to their campaign pledge. The 
legislature should then ‘rubber stamp’ the popular decision for to do otherwise would be undemocratic 
(p.6). 
However, Rubber stamp legislatures are unable to make independent contributions to the practice of leading 
their societies (Ibid). According to Johnson, the Duma of the former Soviet Union and the Mexican Congress 
during the decades of PRI dominance can be best explained as rubber stamp legislatures (Johnson, 2005). 
 
Arena Legislatures 
Arena legislatures are the other model of parliamentary power which are placed in between rubber stamp and 
Transformative legislatures for they are more influential than the former and less powerful than the latter. Unlike 
the rubber stamp, Arena legislatures are characterized by the presence of real discussion through which 
parliamentarians articulate differences in societies and evaluate and interpret the policy proposal initiated, most 
often, by executive from different perspectives. In other words, in arena legislatures the society with its diversity 
is represented all together and the initiated public policies as well as the actions of the state are debated and assessed 
through the use of a number of criteria from different point of views so as to and incorporate the societal 
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preferences in its diversity (Ibid).       
As a result, they require sufficient internal capacity and expert staff that help them to properly organize the 
debate and adequately discuss and critically comment on the draft legislatives. In some situations, arena 
legislatures even refine draft legislatives. However, these types of legislatures, in most cases, are unable not only 
to initiate but also to vibrantly restructure the policy proposals. Some scholars compare arena legislatures` 
functions in analogy, figuratively speaking, with thermometers for arena legislatures are able to accurately mirror 
the ‘political temperature’ with regard to the issues before them`. The British House of Commons is the commonly 
mentioned good example of the arena legislature model (Ibid). 
 
Transformative Legislatures 
Transformative legislatures are legislatures that are capable of initiating their own policies, representing diverse 
societal interests and shaping budgets and policies. Furthermore, such legislatures, even if they are rare, not only 
represent but also lead (Johnson, 2005). In general, the distinctive features of legislatures in the transformative 
model are that they require highly complex internal structures and adequately trained expert staffs as well as have 
a diversified need of information in order to undertake their legislative function effectively. Transformative 
legislatures are also known for their active engagement and meaningful independence and power over the 
executive. The functions of this type of parliament model are seen in relation with the role of a thermostat. The 
implication of the analogy is that as it is true for a thermostat to change the temperature of a room through air 
conditioning or heat activation. Transformative legislatures are also able to affect the content and other important 
issues of any policy proposal brought to them since their engagement is active and meaningful in determining the 
fate of the budget as well as the policies.  
As a result of all this, it is not surprising that not only they are the most expensive of all of the models but 
also there are only few practical examples of them. In addition, it is more likely for the presidential system than 
its parliamentary counterpart to develop and possess transformative type of legislatures. Hence, the US Congress 
is frequently cited by different scholars as the best example of a transformative legislature. 
 
The LPEI and Its Component Variables 
In order to describe the practical power and effectiveness level and identify the parliamentary model that best 
explains the FDRE parliament, we constructed a legislature power and effectiveness index (LPEI) based on various 
indicators explained in different literatures related with the parliamentary power models. Some of these indicators 
that were used in previous studies are also included in the LPES but adapted and amended so as to address the 
question under investigation properly with regard to the Ethiopian context. Therefore, a total of 30 dummy 
variables/items that were coded as 1 and 0 were used to assess the power and independence of the FDRE parliament 
so as to include it in one of the parliamentary model categories (see annex A). Brief descriptions of the codes, 
indexes, and indicators as well as the data and analysis methods are presented as follows: 
LPEI: The legislature power and effectiveness index (LPEI) is an index that consists of five sub-indexes and 
a total of 30 indicators that measure the practical power and effectiveness level of the FDRE parliament. The index 
assesses the practical formal legislative and oversight power held by the current FDRE legislature as well as its 
effectiveness level in the policy making process. Specifically, The five sub-indexes evaluate the formal legislative 
power, its formal oversight power, its capability in undertaking the legislative and oversight functions, and its 
effectiveness in representing the needs, and diversified interests of the public throughout the policy making process. 
In order to identify the indicators and construct the LPEI, we undertake a thorough document review and 
analysis. We reviewed a vast majority of literatures, empirical studies, and other relevant secondary sources 
including the word for word minutes of the parliament, the FDRE constitution, etc. Even though the document 
review and analysis process was time-taking and painstakingly demanding, it help us not only to construct the 
LPEI but also to generate adequate data that we used to provide appropriate responses for each of the 30 items 
included in the five sub-indexes. 
On the basis of the literature review and document analysis, we extracted the first two sub-indexes 
(component variables) and a total of 11 indicators from the work of M. Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig (2007), 
and then, we adapted and used them in our study. These two sub-indexes, LPI and OPI, measure the formal 
legislative as well as oversight power of the FDRE legislature  in relation to the policy making process. Besides, 
we added the remaining three sub-indexes (component variables) having a total of 19 items that gauge 19 indicators 
of the legislative capacity, the oversight capacity and the representativeness qualities of the FDRE legislature in 
the policy making process. The inclusion of these 3 sub-indexes (component variables) in the LPEI is guided by 
our intent to assess the real practical power, independence and effectiveness level of the legislature in carrying out 
its legislative function throughout the policy making process. If we want to gauge the real practical power and 
influence of the parliament as policy scholars, we need to decide that we had to include some indicators that could 
measure the actual capabilities of the parliament in terms of its legislative, oversight and representation 
performance during the policy making process. 
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The First component variable of the LPEI- legislative power index (LPI) - is an index that measures and 
determines the aggregate formal legislative power held by the legislature. Hence, the variable consists of 6 
items/indicators that gauge the powerfulness of the legislature in terms of holding the required formal legislative 
power and its least and maximum value ranging from “0" (least powerful) to "6" (most powerful). The six items 
ask whether the executive lacks decree power, laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or essentially veto-
proof, the legislature's laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review, the legislature has the right to initiate 
bills in all policy jurisdictions, the legislature's approval is necessary to ratify all treaties with foreign countries, 
and has power to amend or reject legislative proposals initiated by the executive. 
Oversight power index (OPI) is the second sub-index that measure the aggregate strength of the legislature’s 
oversight power that could be used in the policy making process. The index consists of a total of 5 items/indicators 
that measure the legislature’s specific oversight powers related to the policy making process, and its least and 
maximum value ranges from "0" (least powerful) to "5" (most powerful). The items in this sub-index ask whether 
the legislature possesses formal power to question the executive and force it explain its policies/plans, can conduct 
independent investigation of the chief executive and the agencies of the executive, has effective powers of 
oversight over the agencies of coercion, can vote no confidence in the government, and is immune from dissolution 
by the executive. Here, it should be noted that, the LPI and OPI are the two component variables of the LPEI that 
have been extracted and adapted Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig (2007) study. 
The third component variable of the LPEI, legislative capability index (LCI)-determines the aggregate 
practical legislative capabilities of the FDRE parliament observed during the legislative process through the 6 
items/indicators included in the index. The variable’s least and maximum value ranges from "0" (incapable) to "8" 
(most capable). The items enquire about whether the legislature practically proposed at least one bill, undertaken 
meaningful and open debate on the legislative proposals (assessed in terms of time spent and substantive 
amendments raised), referred many (75%) of  the  legislative proposal to the respective standing committees, made  
adequate substantive (at least 50 %) amendments/ changes on the legislative proposals, undertaken a clause-by-
clause scrutiny of at least 75 % of legislative proposals, and  approved all treaties with foreign countries. 
The fourth component variable of the LPEI is OCI. Oversight capability is one of the important qualities 
expected from a legislature in order to undertake its legislative function powerfully, efficiently and effectively. 
Hence, OCI is an index measuring the aggregate strength of the legislature's oversight capabilities observed during 
the policy making process. Accordingly, the index consists 6 items/indicators that we used to assess whether the 
legislature is capable of performing its oversight function throughout the policy making process independently and 
effectively, and its least and maximum value ranges from "0" (incapable) to "6" (most capable). Specifically 
speaking, the group of items in this sub-index gauge whether the legislature made adequate use of question periods 
or hearings requiring executive minister’s attendance, adequately investigated the policy implementation 
performance of the ministers and ministry officials, made use of public hearings and the media to apply pressure 
on the executive, there was in time provision of  legislative proposals, made the executive subject to present a brief 
analysis about the contents and purposes of draft laws, and took appropriate measure on those who had a serious 
problem in relation with policy implementation. 
Effective representation appears to be one of the main criteria to consider whether a legislature is powerful 
and effective player in the policy making process. Hence the fifth and final variable used for the LPEI - effective 
representation index (ERI)   - is an index that gauges the FDRE parliament’s aggregate strength and effectiveness 
level in representing the interests, concerns, and diversified needs of the public during the policy making process. 
This variable consists 7 items that measure the effectiveness level of the legislature related to specific qualities of 
its representation functions throughout the policy making process, and its least and maximum value ranges from 
"0" (ineffective) to "7" (effective representative).  Particularly, these  group of items evaluate whether the 
legislature made a conscious effort to be representative, was open to citizens and the media, adequately (at least 
50% of the amendment issues raise by stakeholder) incorporated citizen concerns into policy proposals, allowed 
think tanks and universities to regularly (at least once a year) provide, information and analysis to the legislature, 
used various systems/mechanisms to promote the citizens’ understanding and knowledge of legislators’ role, had 
adequate representation of the diversity of  political opinions in the country, and provided public policy related  
information to the public on timely basis. 
 
Research Design, Data and Methods 
We used a descriptive type of research design and a dominant qualitative research approach in the study. The 
descriptive design was selected to accurately describe the legislative and oversight powers possessed by the 
legislature as well as to provide a precise and valid explanation of its actual capabilities and representation 
effectiveness level. This study is mainly the product of secondary data gathered from rigorous document analysis. 
Hence, we heavily relied on qualitative data collected from a number of relevant secondary sources using document 
review as a data collection method. The document review activity included reviewing relevant literatures, 
empirical studies, policies, laws, guidelines, legislative document which are, in one way or another, related to the 
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role of  FDRE parliament in the policy making process at federal level. In particular, the FDRE parliament`s 15 
formal and 3 special sessions’ word-for-word minutes; the four standing committees’ formal meetings as well as 
evidence taking and public hearing sessions’ minutes and official reports were thoroughly reviewed. Though it 
required our painstaking effort, we employed  this data collection instrument for it allows to obtain information 
from the participants’ own words, as well as its appropriateness to provide adequate, reliable and objective data 
that were required to answer and score all the 30 items found in the 5 sub-indexes (component variables) of the 
LPEI. Furthermore, we make use of this data collection method to identify and come up with the component 
variables as well as the item/indicator that we used to construct the LPEI.  
Moreover, we focused on analyzing, and quantifying the qualitative data in order to produce quantitative data  
and provide a systematic objective measurable picture that help to better understanding of the practical power and 
electiveness level of the FDRE parliament in the policy making process. 
With regard to the Scoring System, a checklist was prepared having all the 30 items/indicator variables in the 
form of questions. Then, we code each of the items in the five sub-indexes as dichotomous variable. Based on data 
generated through a thorough literature review and analysis of relevant secondary sources, we scored the item in 
the affirmative if the legislature possesses the power or capable of doing the case in question. If the legislature 
lacks the power or incapable of doing the case in question, the item is scored in negative. Then, we gave a value 
of one (1) for the indicator if the response for the item/when question was affirmative, and zero (0) if negative. 
Consequently, each of the five indexes (LPI, OPI, LCI, OCI, and ERI) is calculated by summing the value given 
for each indicators included in them and dividing by the total number of their respective indicators, which ranges 
from zero (least powerful/effective) to one (most powerful/effective). Thus, the LPES is the overall score of the 
FDRE parliament that is obtained by adding the values of the five indexes divided by the total number of indexes. 
LPES= (LPI+ OPI+LCI+ OCI+ERI)/5 
An identical and dichotomous scoring system for each item/question was used for the following two reasons: 
first, the system helps us to keep consistency across all items in the LPEI; second, it makes the aggregation of the 
individual items into the larger index very easy. Note should be taken that there are other scoring systems. However, 
as described above, we stick with the dichotomous system in order to make the presentation of the data consistence, 
as well as to make the comparison as well as aggregation of items less difficult and easily understandable. Finally, 
to arrive at the final score of the LPEI, we divide the total number of affirmative answers by the total number of 
items in the LPEI. 
In terms of data analysis methods, we used descriptive statistics in order to make sense out of the numerical 
data from the LPEI and the five sub-indexes (component variables), and content analysis method to describe, 
present and interpret the findings of the study. Furthermore, we used SPSS version 22 and Microsoft excel for 
encoding data, and facilitating the data quantification process as well as generating some graphs. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The practical power and effectiveness level of the FDRE Parliament in the policy making process 
This section provides the results and discussions of the study. Figure 1 presents the summary of the results of the 
LPEI as well as the five indexes followed by their findings and discussions of each of the five sub-indexes as 
follow: 
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Figure 1: Practical power and effectiveness score of the FDRE parliament 
The Figure provides the maximum value, the obtained value, and the final results of the LPEI and the five 
sub-indexes namely: the legislative power index, the oversight power index, the legislative capacity index, the 
oversight capacity index, and the effective representation index.  
 
Formal Legislative Powers 
Figure 1 shows that five of the six formal legislative powers received the affirmative response with LPI value of 
0.84, after rounding. The FDRE parliament formal legislative power is, therefore, placed in the ‘most powerful’ 
category in the scale above. In other words, based on the result of the content analysis, there is an apparent 
monopoly on law making authority, power to make laws without great concern from the executive’s defiance, 
power to protect the legislature’s laws from judiciary review, power to approve treaties with foreign countries, and 
power to amend/ or change any legislative proposal initiated by the executive are regarded as the most highly 
useful legislative powers vested in the FDRE parliament. In this regard, power to initiate bills in all policy 
jurisdictions is the only indicator that received negative response since the FDRE legislators do not have a mandate 
to initiate, for instance, financial bills. The finding indicates that the FDRE parliament is generally considered as 
the most powerful branch of the government that holds a number of independent legislative formal powers.  
 
Formal Oversight Powers 
With regard to the oversight power index, the result also indicates that the House is categorized as most powerful. 
As indicated earlier, except one, all of the oversight power indicators received an affirmative response. This implies 
that the FDRE parliament possesses the most important oversight formal powers that give it a legal ground to 
undertake its monitoring of policy implementation activities in a problem-solving and effective manner. Put it 
specifically, powers to question the executive and force it to explain its policies/ plans; conduct independent 
investigation of the prime minister and the executive’s agencies; express opposition to the executive with a veto 
of no confidence; as well as power to be immune from dissolution by the executive are found to be vested on the 
FDRE parliament. The power to oversee the policy or program implementation performance of coercion agencies 
is the only indicator that received negative response for this power is not clearly given to the parliament. Therefore, 
the finding suggests that the FDRE legislature, at least in principle, has a legal ground to maintain its independence 
over the executive in terms of the formal oversight powers guaranteed by the FDRE constitution (FDRE, 1995). 
These findings are, to some extent, at odds with the arguments of some literatures stated that a vast number 
of African legislatures do not have adequate formal power to undertake their legislative and oversight functions as 
effective as possible (UNECA, 2005; Kochanek & Hardgrave, 2007). In contrast, the findings of this study provide 
enough empirical support that the FDRE legislature is indeed one of the few legislative bodies in Africa which 
holds the highest formal constitutional legislative and oversight powers. Moreover, the finding is evident that, if 
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the FDRE legislature is not effective in the public policy making process, the major cause might be some other 
things not due to lack of possessing adequate level of formal legislative and oversight powers. 
 
Legislative Capabilities 
Regarding the LCI, figure 1 shows that the FDRE parliament is relatively least effective in undertaking its 
legislative function. Of the indicators included in this index, only one indicator, “approving all the treaties with 
foreign countries”, received an affirmative result. In other words, the parliament is capable of approving all the 
treaties with foreign countries. On the other hand, the score of all the remaining five indicators were negative, 
implying that the FDRE parliament is  a) unable to initiate any legislative proposal since all the nineteen proposals 
(in the first nine months of the first year of the fifth tenure of the legislature) were exclusively initiated and 
proposed by the executive, implying the ineffectiveness of the parliament to exercise its formal power to introduce 
legislative proposals, b) incapable of undertaking meaningful and open debate on the legislative proposal. This 
indicator was assessed in terms of both the time spent to discuss legislative proposals and the percentage of 
substantive amendments over technical amendments and clarify questions raised during the discussion/deliberation. 
Accordingly, the total time spent on scrutiny of all the nineteen bills was about thirty-seven hours, of which the 
highest share (about twenty-seven hours) goes to the two specific legislative proposals namely authentication and 
registration of documents’, and Ethiopia’s overseas employment bills. Put it differently, the total time spent for 
considering all of the legislative proposals excluding the mentioned bills was only eleven hours (on average thirty-
nine minutes for each legislative proposal) which is much below the required time to undertake a meaningful 
discussion as well as a sound debate. Though it is expected and possible for MPs to oppose the approval of bills 
that tend to be endorsed without any significant deliberations and scrutiny by a pertinent committee, the result of 
the document review shows that they were not capable of doing this.  
In addition, during the discussion and scrutiny of the legislative proposals, a total of two hundred sixty 
questions and amendment motions were raised, of which only seventy-nine (30%) were found substantive. One of 
the surprising results in this regard was the fact that the parliament has enacted four legislative proposals without 
raising any technical or substantive issues in order to improve the quality of the bill presented by the executive. 
The implication, here, is that the FDRE parliament did not have adequate capability to undertake meaningful and 
open debate on legislative proposals. c) Of the nineteen legislative proposals, seven (36.8%) bills were neither 
referred to the respective standing committee nor was any justification provided for why they were not referred. 
Besides, it’s believed that at least four of the seven bills that are related with financial issues should be referred to 
the finance and budget standing committee so as to initiate detail deliberations. However, the parliament spent 
even less an hour to enact these legislative proposals with no substantive change. The next indicator assessed (d) 
the percentage of the substantive amendment made by the legislators and accepted. As indicated earlier, there were 
seventy-nine substantive amendments raised, and only twenty (10%) were accepted. 
This result indicates that the percentage of substantive amendment is not satisfactory enough to consider the 
FDRE parliament as powerful and effective in bringing about adequate and substantive changes on the legislative 
proposals. Finally, the study also found that the legislators were capable of undertaking a clause-by-clause 
deliberation only in two (10%) bills which indicates that it passed the majority of bills without giving enough 
amount of consideration to produce a law that is well formulated as well as easy to understand and implement. 
This implies that the time spent on the deliberation/consideration of the remaining seventeen bills, was not enough 
to enable the parliament to undertake meaningful and responsive discussions and debates. These findings indicate 
that there exists a considerably high distinction between the provisions and realities being played out. They further 
suggest that such vested legislative powers remain only in the constitution since the legislature is not totally free 
from the domination of the executive branch which emanates from the absence of practical separation of power 
between the two branches. This finding is in line with some studies that revealed that majority of African 
legislatures are not undertaking their legislative role due to the executive branch’s domination (Eberlei and Henn, 
2003; UNECA, 2006). 
 
Oversight Capabilities 
The aforementioned Figure 1 further indicates that the oversight capability of the FDRE parliament indicators also 
fell into the least effective category since the responses received by 5 of the 6 legislative oversight capability 
indicators were negative. According to parliament’s regulation no 6, 2008, the parliament can question any 
minister once a week and the prime minister once in a month for an hour. However, the result of the document 
analysis shows that the parliament’s performance in using the question periods and hearings periods requiring 
executive ministers’ attendance was inadequate. In this regard, only two of the ministers could attend and fulfill 
their annual quota of appearance to HoPRs. Besides, the parliament was unable to undertake systematic and 
organized oversight mechanisms to investigate the policy implementation and program activities of ministers and 
ministry officials. For instance, until the fifth month of the annual budget year, the number of ministries and 
executive agencies that submitted their annual plans was not more that 5%. Besides, as far as the selected five 
Journal of Poverty, Investment and Development                                                                                                                             www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2422-846X     An International Peer-reviewed Journal 
Vol.41, 2018 
 
48 
standing committees are concerned, none of the executive agencies and departments did show up before the 
committee to present and defend their quarterly performance reports. Even at the House level, until the 13th formal 
sessions, there were only two ministries that appeared before the House and defend their report. Moreover, as 
revealed during the intensive investigation of their formal meeting minutes, most of the standing committees failed 
to provide timely feedback to the concerned agencies and departments of the executive body. This implies that the 
parliament was unable to ensure whether the majority of the ministries and executive agencies’ annual plan were 
consistent with the policies, strategies, programs and laws they promised to implement. There was also a problem 
with the regularity and timeliness regarding the submission of the quarterly and midyear plans as well as 
performance reports. Moreover, despite the occurrence of at least a single field trip activity in the fifth tenure of 
the legislature, almost all of the standing committees rarely undertook independent investigation and field work-
based oversight activities to monitor and evaluate the policy and program implementation of the agencies of the 
executives. Regardless of the crucial importance of field visit-based oversight to compare and contrast with the 
previously set plans and performance reports, it was found out that rather than insisting on and facilitating for the 
activity, the leadership prohibited some standing committees. For instance the budget and finance affairs 
committee, did not to undertake field visit and they cancel their plan. These results indicate that the FDRE 
parliament is not exercising its legislative oversight role properly and effectively to monitor and investigate the 
performances of the executive branch.  
The other indicator we assessed was the oversight capacity of the FDRE parliament in terms of its use of 
public hearings and the media to apply pressure on the executive regarding public policy issues. As revealed during 
the analysis of the document review, such a trend is not well developed as far as the FDRE parliament is concerned. 
Though some attempts were made to allow groups, individuals, and related stakeholders during the legislative 
scrutiny process of two bills at committee stage, the parliament is not continually interacting with the public 
throughout the public policy making process so as to understand and bring the views, concerns and interests of the 
constituents to the attention of implementing institutions. In consequence, it is not uncommon to see nowadays 
even the executive is revealing that there are a number of policy implementation and good governance problems. 
However, there is no formal evidence that indicates the parliament made adequate use of the media, public forums 
or its website in order to discuss with the general public in order to properly understand the depth and the 
whereabouts of the real problems, and those who are responsible for such problems. As a result, it can safely be 
concluded that inability of the parliament to engage citizens in the public policy making for using different 
mechanisms is considered as one of the indications of its ineffectiveness in the policymaking process. 
With regard to the final indicator of the OCI, the result revealed that the parliament is incapable of taking 
appropriate measures against the executive branch for reasons that may include the following instances: the 
parliament could  not either reject some of the articles found inconsistent with  the constitution or force the 
executive to make necessary compliance; in addition, some ministries’ plan were found to be not only copy of the 
previous annual year’s plans but also the one that did not fulfill the criteria, however, the respective standing 
committees approved the so called ‘annual plans’ while some MPs had a reservation on the decision since they 
believed the plans should be sent back to the ministries for necessary modifications. This, again, implies that the 
FDRE parliament is incapable of taking appropriate and timely measures in order to maintain the intention of the 
constitution. In general, the finding shows that of the 6 indicators within the OCI, the FDRE parliament is effective 
only in one, making the executive subject to present a brief presentation on the legislative proposals during the 
legislative process. Accordingly, based on the overall result of the OCI (which is 0.17), it can be safely be 
concluded that the parliament carried out its legislative oversight function only to a very limited extent. 
These findings indicate that there is no itching reprimands directed the executive. It further suggests that the 
legislature’s ineffectiveness to bring about a significant outcome from its policy oversight activities may be 
attributed to the presence of a single dominant party in the House which continually practices strict party discipline 
on its members. Absence of opposition parties in the House might also be another possible factor for the topic 
under consideration. The findings are in broad agreement with the results of some studies. For instance, Barkan 
(2009) points out that presence of a very dominant party and harsh party discipline, together with absence of 
opposition parties are major aspects of a given political System that affect most legislatures’ effectiveness 
especially in Africa. 
Although the parliament possesses the highest oversight powers in the country, it is also evident that the house 
is not effectively using its important formal legislative and oversight powers. The result indicates that the FDRE 
legislature is not independent from the executive body since the legislative process is almost controlled by the 
latter. This finding confirms the finding of the African governance report for 2005 that revealed many legislatures 
in Africa, including the FDRE legislature, are not free from the domination of the executive with regard to their 
role in the public policy making process. What makes the FDRE legislature’s case a bit different from most of 
them is the degree of domination tends to be much stronger. Furthermore, most of the results presented here are in 
line with the findings of some previous studies conducted by Ethiopians. For instance, Abebe (2005), Tiruye (2015), 
Kahsay (2013), Atsbeha (2012), and Awel (2011) found out that the inability of the FDRE legislature to perform 
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its legislative activities such as introducing bills, undertaking meaningful discussion and substantive deliberations 
and making substantive amendments, taking appropriate measures, etc. 
 
Effective Representation 
In this regard, the result shows that the only indicator that received affirmative response was ‘openness’, indicating 
the FDRE parliament is open/accessible to citizens, and the media at least during scrutiny processes of the two 
legislative proposals. Whereas the result of the document analysis revealed that the parliament is not making a 
conscious effort to be representative, there was no formal forum organized for the public to provide and receive 
information and debating points regarding problem identification, policy implementation and evaluation issues in 
each of the policy process. No formal attempt was made to address questions and public policy implementation 
problems /concerns/ of the constituents to the executive. In general, the parliament does not have a well - 
established system or effective mechanism by which MPs continually interact with their constituents in order to 
understand their views, interests and concerns regarding public policy related issues. Regardless of its effort to 
allow the public at least during the scrutiny process of the two legislative proposals, the FDRE parliament is not 
adequately incorporating citizens’ concerns, issues and interests that are raised during the public hearing forum 
into the legislative proposal. For instance, of the seventy-two substantive issues raised by the participants during 
the hearings, only three (4%) were accepted. 
Taking into account the rejection of the majority of amendments with very important substances, it can be 
concluded that the parliament is not effective with regard to the case under consideration. Similarly, the parliament 
was found to be ineffective with regard to allowing think-tanks and universities to regularly provide information 
and analysis to the legislators as well as the general public. The result of the document review revealed the fact 
that not only such a system is absent, but also there is no formal evidence that revealed the parliament is doing in 
collaboration with think-tanks and universities. Moreover, it is found that an insignificant effort was exerted to 
provide a system/mechanism/ in order to promoting citizens’ understanding and knowledge of legislators’ role in 
the legislative process. With regard to adequate representation of the diversity of political opinions in the country, 
the FDRE parliament’s effectiveness level is found to be inadequate not only for there is no any opposition party 
or individual member in the House, but also no opposition party was invited to engage in throughout the public 
policy making process. Thus the finding vividly shows that the extent to which the parliament adequately 
represents diverse political opinions in the country is unsatisfactory. 
With regard to the final indicator of the ERI, Parliament’s performance to provide the necessary policy-related 
information to the public in a timely manner is also very unsatisfactory. Though the FDRE parliament has its own 
website, it is not properly and effectively used to disseminate information such as legislative proposals, 
proceedings of standing committees, and the like. In addition, it is not using its website effectively for informing 
the public about what it is really doing regarding public policy making processes, how the public can air their 
concerns, areas of the legislative proposals as well as the policy implementation problems it is facing, to be known 
to the parliament.  These findings go in line with some researches that found the legislature’s ineffectiveness not 
only to establish a mechanism that allow the public to actively participate throughout the public policy making 
process, but also to work in collaboration with of key stakeholders such as universities, think thanks and the likes 
(Tiruye, 2015; Atsbeha, 2012). 
As clearly shown in figure 1, the overall picture is reflected through the FDRE parliament’s power and 
effectiveness score (0.4), which is even below the average value. This implies that even if most of the legislative 
and oversight legal powers are vested in the FDRE parliament, the House was not practically and effectively using 
these important mandated powers during the policy making process. In other words, the FDRE parliament is quite 
powerful on its provision paper but not in practice. The study also further revealed that all of the legislative 
proposals made and submitted by the executive were simply accepted and endorsed by the legislature even without 
adequate substantive change. In this regard, one can argue that the FDRE legislatures are not totally free to make 
decision according to the constitution and their conscience. The overall finding of the study is broadly in line with 
what is mentioned by the African governance report for 2005: “ in terms of enacting laws, debating national issues, 
checking the activities of the government and in general promoting the welfare of the people, these duties and 
obligations are rarely performed with efficiency and effectiveness in many African parliaments’’ (UNECA, 2005, 
p.127). 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The study uncovered the fact that the FDRE legislators are not practically capable of making meaningful 
discussions and significant constructive debates to enhance the contents of the legislative proposals, providing 
adequate and substantive amendment, undertaking enough legislative scrutiny, etc. It was also found that since 
there is no clear practical separation of power between the FDRE legislature and the executive party,  MPs tend to 
be loyal to their party and its preference than the constitution, their conscience, and the public. As a result, they 
were even unable to reject some articles that were not consistent with the constitution. In other words, they did not 
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incorporate enough amounts of the public and interest groups’ interests, concerns, and substantive ideas in the later 
stages of the legislative process; they fail to take appropriate measures, etc. The analysis further suggests that 
FDRE legislators do actually have little influence over the legislative proposals proposed by the executive. The 
findings further speak most directly to the inability of FDRE legislators to undertake their oversight activities to 
monitor and evaluate the performance of the executive body with regard to the public policy making process in 
general and policy implementation in particular.  
Besides, the FDRE legislature is found to be least effective in representing the concerns wills and diversified 
interests of the public. All in all, though the FDRE legislature holds very great legislative and effectiveness powers, 
its legislative and oversight capabilities as well as its representation qualities are categorized as least effective. 
Hence, the overall legislative power and effectiveness level of the FDRE legislature in the public policy making 
process is found to be even below the average and considered as least effective. Moreover, the findings indicate 
that the FDRE parliament can be best explained as rubber-stamp parliamentary model for it is not practically 
powerful and effective. The FDRE legislature, unlike many legislatures in Africa, however, holds remarkable 
legislative and oversight constitutional powers. Yet, it uses neither of the powers practically in an efficient and 
effective way. Therefore, it can be fairly concluded that holding a number of formal legislative and oversight 
power is important but cannot be sufficient to become an independent, powerful and effective actor in the political 
system. 
On the basis of the findings of this study the following recommendations are made: 
• Having a certain power may seem good by itself, but it is nothing if the power holder is not free to use it. 
Therefore, those who held the highest practical power should let the MPs to function with total freedom and 
responsibility. 
• The legislature should establish a pre-legislative scrutiny system so as not only to reduce the number of 
unsound clarity and technical questions but also to make the legislative process meaningful and alive.  
• Unless impossible, any legislative proposal should be referred to the respective standing committee(s). In this 
regard, there must be clear, measurable and justifiable criteria to decide whether a legislative proposal shall 
be referred for detailed deliberation or not. Besides, the legislature should take the main responsibility to 
undertake detailed and enough legislative scrutiny, to make meaningful discussion and significant constructive 
debate that help to enhance the contents of the legislative proposals, and to provide adequate and substantive 
amendment, etc. 
• There should be a formal law which enforces the legislature to provide policy related information to the public 
on timely basis. The public must be allowed to get access to legislative proposals, laws, minutes …in easy 
and efficient ways. 
• Much attention should be given to reorganize the supporting staff with adequate human and material resources. 
The House shall strive to establish an advisory research institution and have adequate and well trained 
professionals in the policy making area. Moreover, should launch a system to work in collaboration with 
think-thanks, universities, and other legislature. 
• The trend of allowing the public to engage in evidence taking sessions should continue in order that the public 
can exercise their democratic rights to participate in the development of policies and laws. This can also be 
powerful mechanism to ensure the implementation success of any given policy. 
• The legislature has to establish a system and uses variety of mechanisms to promote the publics’ understanding 
and knowledge about the policy making processes as well as the role of major the actors’ including the public 
itself.   
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Annex A: Indexes and variables used for Measuring the Power and Effectiveness Level of the Legislature  
Variable Variable type Coding (coded one if the FDRE legislature .... or… 
LPI (Legislative power index) 
No decree Dichotomous  if the executive lacks decree power 
No veto Dichotomous laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof or essentially veto-proof.   
No review Dichotomous the legislature's laws are supreme and not subject to judicial review 
No gate Dichotomous if the legislature has the right to initiate bills in all policy jurisdictions.  
Treaty 
Dichotomous if the legislature's approval is necessary to ratify all treaties with foreign 
countries. 
Amend right 
Dichotomous has power to amend or reject legislative proposals initiated by the 
executive 
LCI (Legislative capability index) 
Bill proposed 
Dichotomous has power to propose a bill (either by committees or individual 
legislators) 
Debate 
Dichotomous undertakes meaningful and open debate on the legislative 
proposals(assessed in terms of time spent and substantive amendments 
raised) 
Referral 
Dichotomous refers many (75%) of  the  legislative proposal to the respective 
committees 
Amendment 
Dichotomous makes  adequate substantive (at least 50 %) amendments/ changes on 
the legislative proposals  
Deliberation 
Dichotomous undertakes a clause-by-clause scrutiny of at least 75 % of legislative 
proposals  
Approval Dichotomous approves all treaties with foreign countries  
OPI (Oversight power index) 
Question 
Dichotomous has power to question the executive and force it explain its 
policies/plans 
Investigate: 
Dichotomous can conduct independent investigation of the chief executive and the 
agencies of the executive 
Oversee pol Dichotomous has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion  
No conf Dichotomous can vote no confidence in the government. 
No diss Dichotomous is immune from dissolution by the executive. 
OCI (Oversight capability index) 
Attendance 
Dichotomous makes adequate use of question periods or hearings requiring executive 
minister’s attendance 
Invest exec 
Dichotomous adequately investigates the policy implementation performance of the 
ministers and ministry officials 
Pres exec 
Dichotomous makes use of public hearings and the media to apply pressure on the 
executive  
Bill prov Dichotomous If there is in time provision of  legislative proposals 
Presentation 
Dichotomous is makes the executive subject to present a brief analysis about content 
and purposes of draft laws 
Measure taken Dichotomous 
is taking appropriate measure on those who have a serious problem in 
relation with policy implementation 
ERI (Effective representation index) 
Representativeness Dichotomous is making a conscious effort to be representative 
Openness Dichotomous is being open to citizens and the media 
Citizens’ input 
Dichotomous adequately (at least 50% of the amendment issues raise by stakeholder) 
incorporates citizen concerns into policy proposals 
Think tanks’ input 
Dichotomous allows think tanks and universities to regularly(at least once a year) 
provide information and analysis to the legislature 
Citizens’ 
understanding 
Dichotomous uses a system/mechanism to promote the citizens’ understanding and 
knowledge of legislators’ role 
Political diversity 
Dichotomous has adequate representation of the diversity of  political opinions in the 
country 
Info provision 
Dichotomous provides of public policy related  information to the public on timely 
basis 
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Areas Indicators For Assessment Value Evidence 
L
eg
is
la
ti
v
e 
p
o
w
er
 
Power to participate in the making 
of all laws /No decree/ 
1 It has the power to participate in the making of all laws. 
Provided for in FDRE constitution article, 55(1),(10); 
74(3),77(11) and regulation no. 6,2008 article, 60(2) 
Power to make laws without great 
concern for executive defiance /No 
veto/ 
1 Laws passed by the legislature are veto-proof. Provided 
for in regulation no. 6,2008 article, 58/4/ 
The legislature’s laws are the final 
word /No review/ 
1 The parliament’s law cannot be rejected by the 
judiciary. Provided for in the regulation no. 6, 2008 
article …  
Power to initiate bills in all policy 
jurisdictions /No gate/  
0 For instance, it does not have a mandate to initiate 
financial law. 
Power to approve/ratify treaties  
with foreign countries /Treaty/ 
1 Its approval is necessary to ratify all treaties. Provided 
for in the FDRE constitution article,  55/12/ 
Power to amend or reject 
legislative proposals initiated by 
the executive /Amend right/ 
1 It has a mandate to do so. Provided for in regulation no. 
6,2008 article, 64/2,a/ 
L
eg
is
la
ti
v
e 
ca
p
ab
il
it
ie
s 
Able to initiate any bill in any 
policy jurisdictions /Bill 
proposed/ 
0 Of the 19 legislative proposals, none of them were 
initiated by the FDRE legislators (in the first nine 
months of the first year of the fifth tenure of the 
legislature). 
Undertaking meaningful and open 
debate on the legislative proposals 
/Debate/ 
0 -The total time spent (37hours) to discuss and debate on 
all the19 legislative proposals were significantly very 
law (of which the highest share (about 27 hours) goes to 
the 2 specific bills namely authentication and 
registration of documents’, and Ethiopia’s overseas 
employment bills). (i.e., on average thirty-nine minutes 
for each legislative proposal) 
. A total of 260: 119 questions and 143 amendment 
motions were raised of which only 79 (30%) were found 
substantive. It has even enacted 4 legislative proposals 
without raising any technical or substantive issues. 
referring many of  the  legislative 
proposal to the respective 
committees /Referral/ 
0 Of the 19 Legislative proposals only12 (63%) of them 
were refereed. Particularly, 7 (37%) of bills that required 
detailed deliberation were not referred, and no 
justification provided for why they were not referred. 
the parliament spent even less an hour to enact these 
legislative proposals with no substantive change. 
Making adequate substantive 
amendments on the legislative 
proposals /Amendment/ 
0 Of the total of 143 raised 64 were technical, and 79 were 
substantive amendments.   There were seventy-nine 
substantive amendments raised, and only twenty (10%) 
were accepted. 
undertaking a clause-by-clause 
scrutiny of legislative proposals 
/Deliberation/ 
0 Of the total legislative proposals, only 2 (10%)of them 
were subject to clause-by-clause scrutiny. it indicates 
that it passed the majority of bills without giving enough 
amount of consideration to produce a law that is well 
formulated as well as easy to understand and implement. 
Approving all treaties with foreign 
countries /Approval/ 
1 All treaties (10) were approved and ratified by the 
FDRE parliament 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
O
v
er
si
g
h
t 
 p
o
w
er
 
Power to question the executive  
and force it explain its 
policies/plans /Question/ 
1 -Provided for in FDRE constitution article, 55/17/ and 
regulation no. 6, 2008 article, 79/a, b/; 81/1, 3). Besides, 
the annual plan as well as GTP2 were presented   
Power to conduct independent 
investigation of the chief executive 
and the agencies of the executive 
/Investigate/ 
1 Provided for in the constitution , article 55(17) 
 
 
 
Powers to monitor the state’s 
coercive agencies /Oversee pol/ 
0 Not clearly indicated either in the FDRE constitution or 
regulation no. 6, 2008 
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Power to express opposition to the 
government with a veto of no 
confidence /No conf/ 
1 Provided for in the rules and regulation no. 6, 2008 
article,  64/2,d/; 98; 99/4/ 
Immune from dissolution by the 
executive /No diss/ 
1 Provided for in FDRE constitution article, 60(1), and 
regulation no. 6, 2008 article, 6  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
O
v
er
si
g
h
t 
ca
p
ab
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it
ie
s 
Adequate use of question periods 
or hearings requiring executive 
minister’s attendance 
/Attendance/ 
0 Only 2 (%) of the ministers were attended. only two of 
the ministers could attend and fulfilled their annual 
quota of appearance to HoPRs 
Adequate investigating the policy 
implementation performance of 
the ministers and ministry officials 
/Invest exec/ 
0 Not adequate. For instance, until the 5th month of the 
annual budget year, the number of ministries and 
executive agencies that submitted their annual plan was 
not more that 5%. Besides, as far as the selected five 
standing committees concerned, none of the executive 
agencies and departments did appear before the 
committee to present and defend their quarterly 
performance reports. Even at the House level, until the 
13th formal sessions, there were only two ministries that 
appeared before the House and defend their report. 
Use of public hearings and the 
media to apple pressure on the 
executive regarding public policy 
issues throughout the legislative 
process /Press exec/ 
0 There is no adequate use of platform, media, forums, 
and the likes so as to apply pressure on the executive. 
In general, such a trend is not well developed. It is not 
continually interacting with the public throughout the 
public policy making process so as to understand and 
bring the views, concerns and interests of the 
constituents to the attention of implementation 
institutions. There is no formal evidence that indicates 
the parliament made adequate use of the media, public 
forums or its website in order to discuss with the general 
public in order to properly understand the depth and the 
whereabouts of the real problems, and those who are 
creating such problems. 
In time provision of legislative 
proposals /Bill prov/ 
0 About 35% of the legislative proposals was not provided 
in time and adequately. About 10 percent of the 
legislative proposals were not properly prepared in the 
federal official language. 
Making the executive subject to 
present a brief analysis/ 
presentation about the legislative 
proposal /Presentation/ 
1 The executive presented a brief explanation about the 
content and purpose each of the legislative proposals 
Taking appropriate measure on 
those who have a serious problem 
in relation with policy 
implementation /Measure taken/ 
 
0 No appropriate measure was taken. The parliament, for 
instance,  neither reject some of the articles found 
inconsistent with  the constitution nor force the 
executive to make necessary compliance; in addition, 
some ministries’ plan were found to be not only copy of 
the previous annual year’s plans but also the one that did 
not fulfill the criteria, however, the respective standing 
committees approved the so called ‘annual plans’ while 
some MPs had a reservation on the decision since they 
believed the plans should be sent back to the ministries 
for necessary modifications. 
E
ff
ec
ti
v
e 
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
 Making a conscious effort to be 
representative 
/Representativeness/ 
0 
 
There was no formal forum organized for the public to 
provide and receive information and debate regarding 
problem identification, policy implementation and 
evaluation issues in each of the policy process; no 
formal attempt was made to address questions and 
public policy implementation problems /concerns/ of 
the constituents to the executive. In general, the 
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parliament does not have a well established system or 
effective mechanism by which MPs continually interact 
with their constituents in order to understand their 
views, interests and concerns regarding public policy 
related issues. It is not adequately incorporating 
citizens’ concerns, issues and interests that are raised 
during the public hearing forum into the legislative 
proposal. 
Being open to citizens and the 
media /Openness/ 
1 Some groups, interests and individuals were allowed to 
participate least at some stage in scrutiny processes of 
the two legislative proposals during the second reading 
stage at committee level. Sometimes, the proceedings of 
the parliament is televised and also put in news papers. 
is open/accessible to citizens, and the media at least 
during scrutiny processes of the two legislative 
proposals. 
Incorporating citizen concerns into 
policy proposals /Citizens’ input/ 
0 It is not adequately incorporating citizens’ concerns, 
issues and interests that are raised during the public 
hearing forum into the legislative proposal. 
Though many ideas, concerns and interests were raised 
by the groups and individual participants during the 
legislative scrutiny process, almost none of these ideas 
were incorporated in the legislative proposal at later 
stages of the legislative process. For instance, of the 
seventy-two substantive issues rose by the participants 
during the hearings, only three (4%) were accepted. 
Allowing think tanks and 
universities to regularly provide 
information and analysis to the 
legislature /Think tanks’ input/ 
0 Such a system does not exist, and there is no formal 
evidence that revealed the parliament is doing in 
collaboration with them. 
Using a system/mechanism to 
promote the citizens’ 
understanding and knowledge of 
legislators’ role in the public 
policy making process /Citizens’ 
understanding/ 
0 Very little effort was exerted to educate, inform and 
sensitize citizens on public policy making process and 
legislators’ role in the legislative process. 
adequate representation of the 
diversity of  political opinions in 
the country /Political diversity/ 
0 It is inadequate for there is no any opposition party or 
individual member in the house. Besides, no opposition 
party was invited to engage throughout the public policy 
making processes 
On time provision of public policy 
related  information to the public 
/Info provision/ 
0 Policy related information is not timely available to the 
public, and there is no legal requirement that binds the 
Parliament to provide such information 
 
 
